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THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE AS IT RELATES
TO DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
William A. Gregory*

Recently it has become apparent that the usual methods of governmental supervision of land use are unable to cope with some problems of unplanned urban growth. An especially difficult problem is
planning for sufficient open space in spreading urban areas. The traditional solution of condemnation by eminent domain has not proved
capable of allowing cities to insure far in advance that future development will provide needed parks and public use areas. Courts have
resisted such condemnation either by refusing to find a specific enough
public purpose in the projected condemnation or in finding that the
use is too far in the future to justify present condemnation or by finding an insufficient public purpose to permit expenditure of public
funds, even for a voluntary sale.
Legislation permitting condemnation only of development rights
may be the answer to this problem. State governments or other applropriate agencies would be granted the power to condemn the development rights in presently undeveloped land. Upon condemnation the
owner of the undeveloped land would be paid the fair market value
of the right to develop, the value of which right would presumably be
substantially less than the value of the land if acquired in fee simple
absolute.'
Such mini-condemnation would preserve the open space character
of the land, permit continued use by the fee owner (presumably such
use would ordinarily be agricultural), and would avoid the limitations
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A.,
Case Western Reserve University; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard University.
An earlier version of this note appeared in 6 HAv. J. LEGIS. 86 (1968). Reprinted in part by permission of the Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau.
1. A model open space land statute appears at 6 HARv. J. LEGIs. 57 (1968). It
contains, among other things, provisions for the condemnation of development rights.
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which the public purpose doctrine has erected around eminent domain
efforts at total condemnation.
The public purpose doctrine imposes restraints on state action
both in condemning land by eminent domain and in spending funds
raised by taxation of the public. Though some theoretical differences
may exist between the nature of the restraints imposed, for all practical
purposes one may assume that the same objections that can be made
to a program to acquire land by condemnation will also apply to a program to acquire land by purchase. In most states the doctrines have
not been clearly distinguished with the result that identical results can
be expected under either theory. A more pragmatic consideration is
that any legislation which could be sustained under one theory but not
the other would not be feasible.
The general rule is that the state can condemn land only for a
public use. Some courts have construed a public use as use by the
public, others as public advantage. Under either the narrow or the
broad view the fact that private individuals will incidentally benefit
from the taking will not invalidate the taking as long as the use for
which the land is taken is public. [Connecticut, New Jersey, and New
York, for example, apparently adhere to the broad view of what constitutes a public use.] Adequate precedent exists to sustain the use of
of the condemnation and taxing powers to acquire blighted slum land,
and even unblighted land, if necessary to the redevelopment of an area
which considered as a whole is blighted. However, no court has
squarely faced the problem of the acquisition of open-space land in
a rural or suburban area, presently undeveloped, and its development
by the state as part of a comprehensive plan for ultimately private uses.
Although such development by the state of open space land
seems at first blush unconstitutional, at least two alternate theories
might sustain it. The first is an extension of the doctrine of Berman
v. Parker,2 that even unblighted property may be condemned by an urban
renewal agency if the redevelopment of an area as a whole requires
it. Obviously this rationale can cover a great many cases depending
on how widely you define the relevant area. The second is the theory
of excess condemnation. This long recognized exception to the public
use doctrine permits the state to go slightly beyond the strict limits
of necessity in condemning land if the additional land acquired is
necessary for the complete fulfillment of the state's purpose. For ex2. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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ample, in condemning land for a parkway, the state may condemn the
land adjacent to the parkway and then insert deed restrictions that prevent any use of the land that would detract from its scenic beauty.
The state is then free to resell the adjacent land td private owners
as restricted.
Section 1(e) of Article IX of the New York State Constitution,
for example, authorizes quite broad powers of excess condemnation
for local governments. Local governments may take excess land,
abutting on land taken for public use, in order "to provide for appropriate disposition or use" of such land. This may be constitutionally
sufficient authorization for the taking of land for low density residential
development adjoining public open spaces; even if public construction
or subsidy of such residential development is not a public use. Even
excess condemnation for private residential development adjoining
public open space seems authorized by section 1 (e), since the section
goes on to empower local government "to sell or lease that land not devoted to such public (open space) use." Section 7 (e) of Article I also
provides for narrower legislative authorization of local excess condemnation of lands abutting on parks, streets, and other public places, for
suitable building sites.
Article 4, section 6, paragraph 3, of the New Jersey Constitution
authorizes any agency or political subdivision of the state "to take interests in abutting property" to preserve and protect public facilities for
which the state agency is authorized to acquire lands. This provision
seems also to sustain excess condemnation for low density residential
development adjacent to state owned property previously taken for some
public purpose. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court has sustained a highway authority condemnation of lands abutting on a parkway, in part as "insurance against unsightly structures."'
Nonetheless, there will still be some cases to which neither of
these alternative theories would apply; therefore, it is necessary to discuss in greater detail some legislative and judicial precedents.
The Housing Act of 1949 in authorizing urban renewal projects
expressly includes:
. . .land which is predominantly open and which because

of obsolete platting, diversity of ownership, deterioration of
structures or of site improvements, or otherwise, substantially
3. N.J. Highway Authority v. Currie, 35 N.J. Super. 525, 114 A.2d 587, 590 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1955).
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impairs or arrests sound growth of the community, or (iii)
open land necessary for sound community growth which is
.
uses
to be developed for predominantly residential
4

However broad this authorization may appear, it must be remembered
that it is implicitly limited by prior language which refers to an urban
renewal area. It seems obvious that you cannot renew something that
was never developed to begin with. At most this section of the Housing Act is merely authority for the area wide concept of Berman v.
Parker, supra. However, in examining the legislative history of the
Housing Act, its objectives seem far broader than any action taken to
date by the federal government.
It is, of course, perfectly apparent that the elimination of residential slums in central city areas and their redevelopment
in accord with a plan for the most appropriate use of the
land therein (i.e., for public use, for industry, for housing
at more appropriate density, etc.) makes necessary a dispersion of the families now living in such slums. Federal loan
assistance for the acquisition and preparation of open unplatted urban or suburban land to be developed for predominantly housing use, so that adequate provision can be made
for the necessary dispersion of some portion of the central
city population, is therefore essential to any effective slum
clearance operation, and is entirely appropriate.
It can thus be seen that Congress has a very broad view of its powers
to tax and spend for residential development outside the central city,
and, though no judicial precedent exists which tests this interpretation
of the Housing Act, the very fact that Congress would pass legislation
of this nature raises a presumption in favor of its constitutionality.
The closest the state courts have come to deciding this question
is in litigation over the constitutionality of urban redevelopment. The
reasoning in many of these cases would support urban development
equally well. In N.Y. City Housing Authority v. Muller," the court
stated,
It is also said that since the taking is to provide apartments
to be rented to a class designated as "persons of low income," or to be leased or sold to limited dividend corporations the use is private and not public. This objection dis4. 42 U.S.C. 1460 (1970).
5. Senate Report No. 84, Feb. 25, 1949, U.S. ConB CONG. Snav., 81st Cong. 1st

Sess. (1949), p. 1564.
6. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
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regards the primary purpose of the legislation. Use of a
proposed structure, facility, or service by everybody and anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of a public use."
In Murray v. La Guardia,' the court of appeals found no difficulty
in the fact that a private corporation may ultimately reap a benefit.
"If, upon completion of the project the public good is enhanced, it
does not matter what private interests may be benefitted."'9
Two cases indicate the limits which the public use doctrine places
on the state. In Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer,"0 the facts indicated
the purpose behind the condemnation proceeding was to provide parking facilities for a private apartment building. The end result of the
project would be to provide parking spaces for 308 tenants of one
apartment building, while only 17 spaces would be available for the
general public. The court of appeals invalidated the action because
there was no public purpose involved, stating:
. . . the public use here may be only incidental and in large
measure subordinate to the private benefit to be conferred
on the Company and not for the purposes authorized by the
statute. Of course, an incidental private benefit, such as a
reasonable proportion of commercial spaces is not enough
to invalidate a project which has for its primary object a public purpose . . but the use is not public where the public
benefit is only incidental to the private.11
In Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority,:2 the
majority of appellate division justices, though agreeing that the World
Trade Center represented a public purpose, found the statute on its
face unconstitutional since it granted a power to condemn property for
no other purpose than the raising of revenue for the expenses of the
project. The court of appeals, 6-1, saved the statute by a limited
interpretation of the power of eminent domain. The dissent would
have held the statute unconstitutional.
Wilson v. Long Branch,'" involved an urban redevelopment project of about 100 acres, 28 of which were vacant and unimproved.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, relying heavily on Berman v. Parker,
supra, sustained the constitutionahty of the program. In City of Tren7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

1 N.E.2d at 155.
291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943).
52 N.E.2d at 888.
302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2d 235 (1951).
Id. at 238.
12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.2d 1 (1963).
27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837 (1958).
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ton v. Lenzner,'4 the New Jersey Supreme Court approved condemnation of property for off-street parking,
The public use may be proprietary as well as strictly governmental in nature .

.

. What constitutes a proper use will

depend largely on the social needs of the times and may
change from generation to generation. 15
In Connecticut an urban redevelopment program was sustained
in Gould Realty Co. v. City of Hartford,16
In this state it is settled that public use means public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit, so that any appropriating of private property by the
state under its right of eminent domain for purposes of great
advantage to the community, is a taking for public use."1
While it is apparent from these cases that courts are usually willing to approve condemnations for urban development, it is not clear,
because there seem to be no cases exactly in point, whether courts
would approve condemnation in an undeveloped area. What is clear
is that the objectives and purposes of those urban redevelopment programs that have been approved by the courts are the same as the objectives and purposes of a statute providing for the condemnation of
development rights. As Robbins and Yankauer conclude,
There is no difference, except one of degree, between
blighted land which adversely affects health and welfare and
open land which, by its non-use, keeps people crowded in
unhealthful surroundings .

.

.

To deal with the problem

adequately the courts must find that conditions today require
the taking of vacant land for sound community development,
which in itself is a public use. 8
Can the power of eminent domain be used to acquire land if
there is no present use for it? (This question is raised by the inherent
nature of a development right.)
There is a division of opinion on this issue. In State ex rel. City
of Duluth v. Duluth St. Ry.,' 9 action of a municipality to condemn land
for an extension of a street railway was held unconstitutional because
14. 16 N.J. 465, 109 A.2d 409 (1954).
15. 109 A.2d at 411.
16. 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
17. 104 A.2d at 368.
18. Eminent Domain in Acquiring Subdivision and Open Land in Redevelopment
Programs: A Question of Public Use, pp. 463-513 in UxwxN REVaOrarm: PRoBLEMS AD PRAcMCES, (C. WOODBURY ed. 1953).
19. 179 Mimn. 548, 229 N.W. 883 (1930).
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there was no present need for it. (The population to be served was
very small, most of the residents did not want the railway, and the
cost was fairly substantial.) The court stated, "Necessity as here used,
means now or in the near future." This case could easily have been
decided on other grounds, viz., that the real purpose of the extension
was to benefit developers of certain lands at the terminus of the extension.
In State v. 0.62033 Acres,2 0 a Superior Court of Delaware invalidated eminent domain proceedings which had been brought by the
Highway Department. The court considered that possible future expansion of a two lane to a four lane highway was too remote and
speculative to justify condemnation. The time within which actual use
as a four lane highway would begin was estimated as thirty years.
Possible appreciation of property values during this interval was held
not to be an adequate reason for condemnation.
Winger v. Aires,2 1 involved condemnation of land for a school
site. Much more land was condemned than could be reasonably used.
One witness testified, for instance, that the vice president
of the Board said that the Board could take more land than
it needed for the school building and then sell what remained over. Obviously no school board can, even in this
indirect fashion, go into the real estate business. 2
Grand Rapids Board of Education v. Baczewski, 23 was similar.
There was no present need for the land. The present high school
was estimated to be adequate for the next thirty years. The Board's
main purpose in buying early was to save money. "Such a practice
could be highly commended in the Board's purchasing of property, but
does not meet the test of necessity in condemnation proceedings."2 4
There is some hint that this result depends on the specific language
in Michigan's Constitution rather than the public purpose doctrine.
In neither of the preceding two cases, apparently, was there a
showing that the added acquisitions were necessary either (1) to protect the value of the school grounds for school purposes, or (2) to
conserve otherwise unavailable open space for expansion purposes.
On the other side, New Orleans v. Moeglich,25 was a condemna20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

49 Del. 90, 110 A.2d 1 (1954).
971 Pa. 242, 89 A.2d 521 (1952).
89 A.2d at 522.
340 Mich. 265, 65 N.W.2d 810 (1954).
Id. at 269.
169 La. 1111, 126 So. 675 (1930).
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tion proceeding to extend a street. One of the reasons for the condemnation was to save money in putting in the street early, i.e., before
development. The court sustained the action. It indicated that cities
might plan ahead for the "near future."
Carlor v. City of Miami,26 sustained condemnation of land for a
port and airport even though there were only very vague plans when
the condemnation took place and nothing had been done for seven
years thereafter. The decision referred to the duty of public officials
to look to the future and to plan not only for the present but for the
"foreseeable future." These remarks were probably mere dictum
since the court could have decided the case on the ground that it was
too late for a collateral attack of the original condemnation proceedings. (The action was brought several years after the land was condemned. It had risen in value in that time due to improved access.)
All of the cases which invalidate the taking of land for future use
base the denial on one of three grounds: (1) that the taking exceeds
the powers granted by statute; or (2) that no actual public purpose
is served (where the real intent of the condemning authority is to
benefit a private person); or (3) the taking constituted use of the condemnation power to appropriate the owner's appreciation of value.
A legislative program providing for condemnation of development
rights is less susceptible to these objections because the taking is less
severe. The only possible problem is with the appropriation of the
appreciation in value. This does not go to the constitutionality of the
acquisition of a development right, which is supported by an independent public policy of conserving open space, but only to the exercise
of such an interest.
While there are decisions (e.g., Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port
of New York Authority, supra) which seem to suggest that if the state
benefits as a land speculator the taking must be disallowed, they are
not really in point. They indicate that the cost of essential public programs cannot be financed by acquiring revenue-producing private
property to make up deficits arising from unprofitable governmental
programs. This line of cases imposes a limit on the types of property
thq state may acquire under the statute. All property condemned
must be strictly related to accomplishing the purposes of a comprehensive plan, not just thrown in so that the state can make a profit as
a land speculator. If those bounds are exceeded, then constitutional
26. 62 So. 2d 897 (1953), cert. den. 346 U.S. 821.
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doubts begin to arise. The import of the New York cases is that condemnation of private property so that the state may acquire profitable
sources of revenue is no proper public purpose.
Because of this possible objection, a state's power to develop land
in which it holds interests should probably be restricted. Making a
profit on land development is not the purpose behind the suggested
development rights legislation. If, in fact, a development rights program is a net revenue-producing operation, that is completely incidental to the accomplishment of other valid public purposes. If primary
weight is put on the revenue-producing operations of a development
rights program, then more complex constitutional problems arise. For
example, consider the case of development of land in which interests
are held when such development becomes necessary because of a
shortage of middle income housing in an area where there is a surplus
of open space.
It should be noted that in taking an interest in land, the state
is not interfering with the owner's present use of the land; hence, there
should be less reason to object to takings that are necessary to provide
for the foreseeable future. In balancing the owner's right to retain
any interest in his land at all against the state's right to provide for
the future, one might reasonably define public purpose very strictly.
In contrast, condemning development rights in land avoids this balancing through a limited taking which allows the owner to continue his
present use of the land.
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